Introduction
Dating from Stokey Lucas and Prescott [18] , dynamic programming techniques and the Bellman principle of optimality have been developed to analyze intertemporal equilibria of infinite horizon problems through sequences of two-period problems. In particular, it involves studying existence, uniqueness and computation of the solutions to the Bellman equation.
In the analyzis of intertemporal equilibria, the notion of recursive intertemporal payoff have played a central role. Consider an agent who takes some decision z t in some action set Z at each date t ∈ N. An intertemporal payoff function associates to every action streamz = (z t ) t∈ N in Z N some payoff U (z), so that the preferences of the agent, defined on Z N , are represented by U . The function U is recursive if the intertemporal payoff from today U (z) = U (z 0 , z 1 , . . . , z n , . . .), is a function A(z 0 , U (z 1 , . . . , z n , . . .)) of the action today z 0 and the intertemporal payoff from tomorrow U (z 1 , . . . , z n , . . .).
The function A involved in this definition aggregates the current action z and the future payoff into the current payoff, and is called aggregating function, or aggregator.
There are two main approaches to deal with recursive payoffs: the first, initiated by Koopmans 1 [7] , provides an axiomatization of preferences which leads to a recursive payoff function. The second takes the aggregator function as a primitive, and provides conditions under which there exists some recursive payoff (see Stokey and Lucas [17] , Becker and Boyd [2] , Streufert [20] , Le Van and Vailakis [9] ).
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In this paper, we propose some dynamic programming tools without any reference to recursive payoffs. Two main arguments advocates for such an approach. First, such a recursive payoff does not always exist. Second, as proved in this paper, even if such a recursive payoff exists, preorders on the action sequences induced by a given aggregator and by an associated recursive payoff may be different.
This setting allows also to encompass models with possibly unbounded pay-offs. The use of dynamic programming tools for additively separable models with unbounded payoffs was first initiated by Boyd [3] , Alvarez and Stokey [1] , Duran [4] and Le Van and Morhaim [8] .
Four distinct approaches have been proposed to deal with Bellman equation. First, the Banach contraction theorem (or local version of it) can be applied: for the bounded case, see Stokey Lucas and Prescott [18] , and for the possibly unbounded case, see Rincon-Zapatero and Rodriguez-Palmero [14] or Martins-da-Rocha and Vailakis [11] . Second, a direct approach can be used, and requires some Lipschitz condition on the aggregator (see Le Van and Morhaim or Le Van and Vailakis [9] ). Third, Streufert has proposed to replace the Lipschitz condition by some topological property (biconvergence)
on the recursive payoff function and the feasibility set (Streufert [19, 20] ).
Last, an order-theoretic fixed-point machinery can also be used to replace the Banach fixed-point theorem (see Kamihigashi [6] ).
All these approaches are sometimes connected, and each one has its advantages from some particular point of view: for example, the approach proposed by Kamihigashi [6] avoids topological assumptions, and encompasses the existence and uniqueness part of Rincon-Zapatero and Rodriguez-Palmero [14] and Martins-da-Rocha and Vailakis [11] 's work. But these approaches only consider additive separable models, and they require assumptions that may be difficult to check. Streufert's biconvergence assumption is singular in the literature in the sense that it does not imply nor is implied by the other results.
Our contribution proposes to unify most of these papers (e.g., Streufert [19, 20] , Kamihigashi [7] or Le Van and Vailakis [9] ). In particular, it encompasses some aggregators studied in the literature such as the ones in Jaśkiewicz, Matkowski and Nowak [5] 3 , and Blackwell and Thompson aggregators (see Marinacci Montrucchio [10] ). This is done through a weak continuity assumption on the aggregator. Together with some transversality condition, this ensures the existence and the uniqueness of a fixed-point for the Bellman operator, and also provides an algorithm to reach the value 3 They consider an additive model where the constant discount rate is repaced by a function.
function starting from a suitable initial function.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces aggregators and recursive payoffs, and explains why these payoffs could induce different preferences. Section 3 introduces the aggregator-based optimization program, and compares it to the optimization program associated to any recursive payoff (when it exists). Section 4 establishes general conditions for the value function of the aggregator-based optimization problems to be the unique fixed point of the Bellman operator, allowing this value function to be reached by an algorithm. The main proofs are given in Appendix.
Aggregators versus recursive payoffs

Aggregators, A-payoff and A-recursive payoff
Time is discrete. Consider an entity (agent, firm, player, decision maker,....)
that chooses an action z t at each date t ∈ N (the set of nonnegative integers) in some action set Z. Preferences on Z N are usually modelized through a utility function on Z N . In this paper, an aggregator is instead taken as a primitive:
where Z is called an action set.
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For every current action z 0 and every future payoff
aggregates the current action z 0 and the future payoff v into one current payoff. Similarly, given two actions z 0 and z 1 at t = 0 and t = 1, and given a future payoff v ∈ [−∞, +∞] at date t = 2, the aggregate payoff at t = 0 can be written A(z 0 , A(z 1 , v)). Iterating, for every sequencez = (z t ) t∈N in 4 In the existing literature, the aggregator A is generally defined on Z × R. In this case, if A is increasing with respect to its second argument (an assumption that is made in this paper), such aggregator can be extended to a function Z × R → R by letting
as the aggregate payoff at t = 0, given actions z 0 , . . . , z T −1 of the entity at dates t = 0, . . . , T − 1 and a future payoff v at date t = T .
From now on, we consider that A is a given aggregator.
Remark 2.1. (Additive case) If A(z, v) = u(z) + βv for some instantaneous utility function u(·) and some discount factor β ∈ ]0, 1[, then the intertemporal payoff can be written, when it exists and for every sequence of actions over timez = (z t ) t∈N , as follows:
When such a limit does not exist, one could consider instead the supremum limit (optimistic point of view), or the infimum limit (pessimistic point of view). This motivates the following definition.
Definition 2.2. Given a sequence of actionsz in Z N :
(i) the A-payoff (when it exists) is w(z) = lim T →+∞ A T (z, 0).
(ii) the upper A-payoff is w(z) = lim T →+∞ A T (z, 0).
Given an aggregator, another way to define a payoff is to consider a recursive utility function associated to the aggregator A, which we now define. In the following, let the shift operator S :
Remark that if A ≥ 0, then upper A-payoff, lower A-payoff and A-payoff coincide: indeed, this assumption implies that the sequence (A T (z, 0)) T ∈N is non decreasing, thus it converges (in [−∞, +∞]).
Preference relationships on Z N
Consider an A-recursive payoff U , the A-payoffs w, w and w defined in Section 2.1. Each of these four functions defines a preference on some subset of Z N as follows:
We first associate to U the pre-order U on Z N defined by:
Second, ifZ conv denotes the set of sequencesz ∈ Z N such that the sequence
, we can associate to w the pre-order w onZ conv defined by
the pre-orders w , w being defined similarly on Z N .
The preferences induced by a given aggregator A, and those induced by any A-recursive payoff can be different (for the proof, see the appendix):
Proposition 2.1. There exists an aggregator A such that for every A-recursive payoff U , the pre-order A (induced by the aggregator A onZ conv ) and the pre-order U (induced by some A-recursive payoff function U associated to A) differ.
Optimization programs 3.1 The basic assumptions
The two following assumptions will be retained through the whole exposition: 
Definitions of maximization programs
Let X be the set of states, and x t ∈ X the state at time t.
The law of evolution of x t is defined through a multivalued mapping Γ, defined from X to X, with nonempty values, such that x t+1 ∈ Γ x t . Given two states x t and x t+1 , Ω x t , x t+1 is the set of feasible actions at time t,
where Ω is a multivalued mapping defined from Gr(Γ)-the graph of Γ-to Z with nonempty values.
Given an initial state x 0 in X, Σ x 0 ) is the set of sequences of actions that are feasible from x 0 , that is:
while Σ x 0 specifies the sequences of actions and states that are feasible from x 0 , that is:
A model is defined as a triple (A, Γ, Ω), A being an aggregator, and Γ and Ω some feasibility correspondences. Given a model (A, Γ, Ω), an A-recursive
, and x 0 in X, let us consider the following optimization problems:
Let v * , v * and v * * defined from X to [−∞, +∞] be the value functions respectively of problem (P ), (P ) and (P ).
We are then interested in comparing these programs (i.e. their values and solutions).
Solutions and values of the programs may differ
The following assumption will facilitate the comparison between the programs.
Null Assumption. [Null Consumption] There exists (a, a, . . . , a, . . .) ∈ ∩ x∈X Σ(x) with U (a, a, . . . , a, . . .) = 0.
Remark 3.1. This assumption is rather weak. This is equivalent to Assumption B6 in Streufert [19] . It could be perceived as a free disposal assumption and is generally valid in economic setups.
The following statement compares the optimization programs defined above (for the proof, see the appendix ).
Proposition 3.1. Let x 0 ∈ X. Consider the optimization programs (P ), (P ) and (P ):
1. The optimization problems (P ) and (P ) (and similarly (P ) and (P )) may have different solutions.
2. Under Null Assumption, v * * (x 0 ) ≥ v * (x 0 ), and this inequality can be strict.
A condition for the programs to coincide
For every x 0 ∈ X, define the sets
is the set of functions from X to [−∞, +∞], is said to satisfy Transversality
Remark that Convention I circumvents the indeterminacy that could arise
Property T1 says that the payoff from t = 0 to time T is greater, asymptotically, if f 1 is used instead of 0 to evaluate payoff at time T . Similarly, Property T2 says that the payoff from t = 0 to time T is greater, asymptotically, if 0 is used instead of f 2 to evaluate payoff at time T .
Transversality allows to make clear the relationship between optimization problems (P ), (P ) and (P ) (for the proof, see the appendix). A(z, v(y)) .
Dynamic programming
In this section we prove that under some weak uniform continuity on the aggregator (called Uniform continuity in v), the optimal values of the problems (P ) and (P ) are fixed points of the Bellman operator (Theorem 4.1).
We also get, under a weaker continuity assumption and transversality condi- In addition, if Z is assumed to be a metric space and Σ x 0 is assumed to be compact for the product topology, then the same result can be obtained under a weaker assumption that we call compact uniform continuity in v. 
Note that for every λ > 0, δ(v) = λ|v| allows to recover the λ-Lipschitz case. Assume Z is a compact metric space, and let A :
The space [−∞, +∞] is endowed with its standard compactification-topology: a neigh-
and a neighbourhood of +∞ contains ]y, +∞] for some y ∈ R.
Convention I). Then
with |A(z n , v n ) − A(z n , w n )| ≥ ε and such that |v n − w n | converges to 0 when n tends to +∞. By compactness, it can be assumed that (z n , v n , w n ) con-
, and by continuity, Consider a continuous aggregator A satisfying
with δ continuous, increasing and such that for every v ∈ R, lim n→+∞ δ n (|v|) = 0. This implies that A is uniformly continuous in v, and that any pair of bounded functions satisfies transversality conditions. Jaśkiewicz Matkowski and Nowak [5] treat the case of aggregators of the form 
Condition (A1), or also the assumption that δ is strictly contracting, ensure that lim n→+∞ δ n (|v|) = 0.
Compact Uniform continuity in v
As a matter of fact, when Z is a metric space, and Σ(x 0 ) is compact for every x 0 ∈ X, uniform continuity in v can be weakened into the following notion, called compact uniform continuity in v, which encompasses several interesting classes of aggregators.
Assumption CUC.
[compact uniform continuity in v] Assume Z is a metric space. The mapping A is said to be compactly uniformly continuous in v if for every compact subset K ⊂ Z, for every ε > 0, there exists η > 0 such that
The following lipschitz-like property, generally easy to check in practice, implies compact uniform continuity, if one additionally assumes continuity of A (for the proof, see the appendix):
Proposition 4.1. Assume Z is a metric space, A is continuous, and that
such that for every (v, v ) ∈ R 2 with |v| ≥ Λ and|v | ≥ Λ, and for every
x ∈ Z, we have
Then A is compactly uniformly continuous in v.
The condition above is similar to some Lipschitz condition in v, where the Lipschitz constant is replaced by a function of z that is assumed to be bounded when z varies in a compact subset of Z.
In practice, a possible way to obtain the criterium of this proposition is to use the mean value theorem: see Example 4.5 for an illustration. 6 this boundedness condition is for example true when f is continuous.
By definition, a Thompson
the following properties (see [10] , page 1783):
1. A is nonnegative and monotone.
Equation
The following proposition, proved in the appendix, says that compact uniform continuity assumption encompasses the class of Thompson aggregators. 
In [10] , it is proved that (1) A is a Thompson aggregator if σ ≤ 1 and either
For such values, the previous criterium can apply. As a matter of fact, compact uniform continuity assumption encompasses additional cases: as an
. It is not a Thompson aggregator, nor a Blackwell aggregator, but it is compactly uniformly continuous in v.
Indeed, the mean value theorem applied to
thus taking Λ = 1, for v ≥ Λ and v ≥ Λ, we obtain
which proves (by Proposition 4.1) compact uniform continuity in v.
7 Note that a Thompson aggregator A is assumed to be defined on Z × [0, +∞[, and not on Z × R as in our paper. It is easy to extend the aggregators to the case of this paper, so that we can apply the main results of our paper to this class of aggregators. 8 In the definition given by Marinacci et al. [10] , it is only required that there exists at least such an a z , but the authors prove uniqueness in Lemma 1 (page 1798).
The existence result
The existence result is detailed in the following statement (for the proof, see the appendix): ii) Z is a metric space, for every x 0 ∈ X, Σ(x 0 ) is compact, and A is compactly uniformly continuous in v.
The following example proves that this result can be false if the aggregator is neither uniformly continuous in v nor compactly uniformly continuous in v.
Example 4.6. Consider the aggregator defined in the proof of Proposition 
Existence, uniqueness and computation of a solution to the Bellman equation under weak continuity
The aim of this section is to refine Theorem 4.1 in order to get some uniqueness result, provide an algorithm to compute the solution, and encompass the aggregators defined from the biconvergent recursive payoff functions as introduced by Streufert [19] , [20] . This is done through transversality and a weak continuity assumption (which is a refinement of the uniform continuity in v assumption).
Weak continuity
where ε = (ε i ) i∈N * . The aggregator A is said to be weakly continuous at v if the function f is upper semicontinuous at 0. 2) Weak continuity implies that f is continuous at 0, lower semicontinuity at 0 being a consequence of the Increasing Monotonicity Assumption.
3) The interpretation of the weak continuity assumption is the following.
Assume that your terminal payoff at t = n is valued with v and imagine a prudent entity that tries to maximize the worst possible payoff from 0 to n, n spanning N. Then, roughly, weak continuity says that the optimal value of this prudent entity should vary continuously at 0 with respect to small additive perturbations of payoffs through time.
The following propositions (for proofs, see the appendix) prove that weak continuity refines Uniform continuity in v, as well as it refines Compact
Uniform continuity in v when feasibility sets are compact. 
Existence, uniqueness and computation of the solution to the Bellman equation
The following theorem (for the proof, see the appendix) shows that transversality and weak continuity allow to get existence, uniqueness and computation of the fixed point of the Bellman operator. x 0 ∈ X, and such that A is weakly continuous 10 at v, we have: Consider the two following sets
11 Actually, Kamihigashi considers a family of optimization problems, parametrized by L ∈ {lim, lim}, and in this subsection, we only derive the supremum limit case.
The Increasing Monotonicity Assumption is satisfied, A is uniformly continuous in v. Moreover, Equations 4.1 and 4.2 imply that the pair (v, v) satisfies the Transversality assumption, since one has for every (z,x) ∈ Σ 0 x 0 :
and similarly for v. By Theorem 4.2, v * is the unique fixed-point of B.
Moreover, taking f = v in Theorem 4.2, the sequence (B n v) n converges to v * for the pointwise convergence. A(y, v(y)).
Definition 4.4. Let U be a A-recursive payoff. The function U is said to be upper convergent over
The function U is said to be lower convergent over
The function U is biconvergent over +∞ t=1 Γ t x 0 if it is both upper and lower convergent over
Another equivalent definition is (see appendix for the equivalence):
Definition 4.5. The function U is biconvergent over +∞ t=1 Γ t (x 0 ) if and only if for everyx ∈ +∞ t=1 Γ t x 0 , for every ε > 0, there exists N ∈ N such that for every x N +1 , x N +2 , . . . ∈ +∞ t=N +1 Γ t x 0 , one has:
Otherwise stated, U is biconvergent over The following result, obtained by Streufert [19] , emerges as a Corollary of Last, assume that max U ( +∞ t=1 Γ t (x 0 )) exists in R, and that U is biconvergent over
is the unique solution to the Bellman equation.
A. Proof of Proposition 2.1.
For every z 0 ≤ 0,
and iterating, we get:
In particular, Thus, 1, −1 and 0 belong toZ conv . In particular, if A is the order defined by A onZ conv , and A is the strict order associated 12 to A , it is obtained that:
We now prove by contradiction the Proposition for A defined above: assume there exists a A-recursive function U which induces the same order. One should have
But since U is A-recursive,
First assume U (0) finite. Then if U (0) ≥ 1, the last equality can be written
and U (0) = 1, a contradiction. Consequently, U (0) = +∞ or U (0) = −∞, which contradicts U (−1) < U (0) < U (+1). This proves that we do not have
B. Proof of Proposition 3.1.
1. Let Z = R and assume that there is no feasibility constraints. Define A
The optimal value of (P ) is 1, and the maximum is reached only at 0, the null sequence, i.e., the set of solutions is Sol(P ) = {0}.
Let us show that Sol(P ) = {0}.
If Sol(P ) = ∅, then clearly Sol(P ) = {0}. If Sol(P ) = ∅, the maximum of U is reached at somez ∈ Σ(x 0 ). Let us then prove by contradiction that U (z)
is infinite.
Assume that U (z) is finite. Then either U (z) < 1 and for every small enough values of a ∈ Z, U (a,z) = A(a, U (z)) = 1 2
− a 2 > U (z) a contradiction. Or for every small enough values of a ∈ Z, U (z) ≥ 1, hence
If U (z) = −∞ then U is constantly equal to −∞ on Z N , and Sol(P ) = Z N = {0}. If U (z) = +∞, then for every a ∈ Z, +∞ = A(a, +∞) = A(a, U (z)) = U (a,z), and by iteration, U (ỹ) = +∞ for every sequenceỹ equal toz except for a finite number of terms. Then Sol(P ) is infinite and Sol(P ) = {0}.
2. We now consider a general aggregator A satisfying Null assumption. Thus, one has
To prove that such an inequality can be strict, consider an aggregator A such that A(z, +∞) = +∞. For every A-recursive payoff U , one can construct a new recursive payoff U as follows: fixz ∈ Z N , and define U z = +∞ if z =z but for a finite number of terms, and U z = U z otherwise. Then U is a A-recursive payoff, and the value of (P ) associated to this payoff is +∞, which is strictly larger than the value of (P ) and completes the argument of the proof.
C. Proof of Proposition 3.2.
Let x 0 ∈ X. We first prove that for everyz ∈ Σ(x 0 ), U (z) ≥ lim n→+∞ A n (z, 0).
If U (z) = +∞ or lim n→+∞ A n (z, 0) = −∞ then the inequality is true. Consequently, we can assume U (z) < +∞ and w(z) = lim n→+∞ A n (z, 0) > −∞.
Since U is A-recursive, for everyz ∈ Σ(x 0 ) and n ∈ N, we have U (z) = A n (z, U (z n+1 , z n+2 , . . .)). Since U is bounded below by v, and from Increasing Monotonicity Assumption, we get, choosing anyx such that (z,x) ∈ Σ 0 x 0 (this exists because w(z) > −∞)
Since U (z) < +∞, we get A n (z, v(x n )) < +∞ for every n. Let ε > 0. From Transversality Assumption (T1), we get that for n large enough,
In particular, A n (z, 0) < +∞ for n large enough. Now, for every n large enough such that A n (z, 0) > −∞ (thus is real),
The above inequality is also true for A n (z, 0) = −∞, and passing to the supremum limit and taking ε → 0, we get U (z) ≥ lim n→+∞ A n (z, 0).
The same proof gives that for everyz ∈ Σ(x 0 ), U (z) ≤ lim n→+∞ A n (z, 0).
D. Proof of Lemma 4.1
Let us show (i) ⇔ (ii) where (i) There exists δ : R → R ∪ {+∞} that tends to 0 at 0 and such that, for
with convention (I), and
(ii) A is uniformly continuous in v. 
Clearly (i) ⇒ (ii). Let us show that (ii) ⇒ (i). Assume
E. Proof of Proposition 4.1.
Assume that the criterium of Proposition 4.1 is true, but that A is not compactly uniformly continuous in v. Thus, there is K compact in Z, ε > 0,
, we have two cases:
(1) Either there is a subsequence of (v n , v n ) which converges. Then, up to a subsequence, we can assume that (z n , v n , v n ) converges to some (z, v, v) ∈ K × R 2 . Passing to the limit in Equation E.1, and from the continuity of A, we get ε ≤ 0, a contradiction.
(2) Or, | v n | and | v n | converges to +∞. By assumption, for n large enough, we get
and passing to the limit, and from the boundedness of f (z n ), we get a contradiction.
F. Proof of Proposition 4.2.
From Property (3) of Thompson aggregators and monotonicity of A, we get that for every z ≥ 0 and every v > v ≥ 0,
and similarly, we get, for every z > 0 and every v ≥ a z ,
which is still true for z = 0 by continuity of A. Now, to prove that A is compactly uniform continuous in v, assume by con-
If (v n , v n ) has a bounded subsequence, then up to a subsequence, we can assume that (z n , v n , v n ) converges to some (z, v, v), and continuity of A gives, passing to the limit in the previous inequality, 0 ≥ ε, a contradiction. Thus, (v n , v n ) has no bounded subsequence, and the two sequences v n and v n tends to +∞.
Let a n such that A(z n , a n ) = a n (such an a n is unique if z n > 0 but it still exists when z n = 0).
Since z n ∈ K, K compact, it is bounded. Let us prove that a n is bounded.
By contradiction, assume that lim n→+∞ a n = +∞. Define η > 0 and N such that n ≥ N implies z n < z + η. By assumption, since z + η > 0, there exists a unique a such that A(z + η, a) = a, and we have A(z + η, a ) > a for a < a and A(z + η, a ) < a for a > a (the function
is indeed strictly decreasing for v ∈ [0, +∞[: see Lemma 1 in [10] ). Thus, if a = a n > a, A(z + η, a n ) < a n . Let N ∈ N such that for every n ≥ N , a n > a. For every n ≥ max{N, N }, we have a n > a and z n < z + η, thus by monotonicity of A, A(z n , a n ) ≤ A(z + η, a n ) < a n which contradicts the definition of a n , and proves that a n is bounded.
In particular, since a n is bounded, permuting v n and v n if necessary, we have v n ≥ v n > a n for n large enough. Equation F.3 gives, for n large enough
a contradiction for n large enough.
G. Proof of Theorem 4.1.
First prove the Theorem if Assumption i) is true. In this proof, to simplify notations, we let w = w and v * = v * . The proof is similar for v * = v * .
Remark that from Boundary condition and Uniform continuity in v, we get that for every z ∈ Z, the mapping v ∈ [−∞, +∞] → A(z, v) is continuous:
this will be used in this proof. Let x 0 ∈ X.
Step 1: first show Bv
there exists a strictly increasing sequence (T n ) of integers, and a sequence
Now, by definition of Bv * (x 0 ) and the definition of v * , we get in particular
Here, we apply to the continuous mapping v → A(z 0 , v) the fact that for every continuous mapping f , f (lim n→∞ a n ) ≥ lim n→∞ f (a n ).
If K → +∞, this gives Bv
Last case: v * (x 0 ) is finite. Similarly to the case above, this implies that for every ε > 0, there exists a strictly increasing sequence (T n ) of integers, and a
The same proof as above (replacing K by v * (x 0 ) − ε) finally gives
for every ε > 0. Thus, we get the inequality when ε → 0.
Step 2: Now, we show Bv
If Bv * (x 0 ) = −∞ then the inequality is true. Thus, consider the two other cases:
We now show that in the three following subcases (v
By definition of v * (x 1 ) = +∞, for every K > 0, there exists a strictly increasing sequence (T n ) of integers, and a sequence (z n ) n≥1 of Σ(
From the definition of v * (x 0 ), we have
Passing to the limit when K tends to +∞, by Boundary assumption, we get
By definition of v * (x 0 ) and Increasing Monotonicity assumption, we have
Since A is uniformly continuous in v, there exists η > 0 (now fixed) such that:
By definition of v * (x 1 ), there exists a strictly increasing sequence (T n ) of integers, and a sequence (z n ) n≥1 of Σ(x 1 ) such that
Now, we prove the theorem when Assumption ii) is true (instead of Assumption i)). The only places where we have used Assumption i) in the proof above is:
• • To get that for every z ∈ Z, the mapping
continuous, which is clearly true if A is only assumed to be compactly uniformly continuous in v (since continuity at v = +∞ or v = −∞ is a consequence of Boundary assumption).
Thus, the proof is unchanged when Assumption ii) is assumed.
H. Proof of Proposition 4.3
Let δ be such that for every (z,
where δ : R → R∪{+∞} tends to 0 at 0. Existence of δ follows from Lemma 4.1. Let x 0 ∈ X. For every (z,x) ∈ Σ(x 0 ), by iteration and by Increasing Monotonicity, one obtains:
For every a > 0, define
This set is nonempty (it contains 0). Moreover, every for every (ε n ) n∈N * ∈ V a and every integer n ≥ 1, ε n−2 +δ(ε n−1 ) ≤ ε n−2 +ε n−2 , thus δ(ε n−2 + δ(ε n−1 )) ≤ ε n−3 . Iterating, one gets
From Equation (H.1) and the definition of f , taking the infimum with respect to n, and then the supremum, one obtains:
which proves the weak continuity of A, that concludes the proof.
I. Proof of Proposition 4.4
Let x 0 ∈ X. Since Σ(x 0 ) is compact (for the product topology), for every n ≥ 0 there exists K n a compact subset of Z such that for every (z,x) ∈ Σ(x 0 ) (which impliesz ∈ Σ(x 0 )), we have z n ∈ K n for every n ≥ 0.
For every n ≥ 0, from compact uniform continuity in v, there exists δ n such
δ n : R → R ∪ {+∞} tends to 0 at 0. For every (z,x) ∈ Σ(x 0 ), by iteration and by Increasing Monotonicity, one obtains:
The end of the proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 4.3.
J. Proof of Theorem 4.2
Consider [v, v] such that (v, v) ∈ V 2 satisfies Transversality, and let v be a fixed point of B on [v, v] , with v(x 0 ) < +∞ for every x 0 ∈ X.
Step 1. First prove that v ≥ v * .
By definition of B and since v is a fixed point of B, one has
Similarly,
and then, from Increasing Monotonicity, for every
, one has:
And by induction,
Since v ≥ v and by Increasing Monotonicity,
Assume now that for every integer T ∈ N * , A T (z, v(x T )) < +∞ . Since v satisfies Transversality assumption (T1), this implies A T (z, 0) < +∞ for every integer T large enough. Let (z,x) ∈ Σ(x 0 ). Now, we prove that 
Taking the supremum limit, Transversality Assumption (T1) implies
Taking the supremum on Σ(x 0 ),
Step 2. Let us prove that v ≤ v * .
For every integer n, let ε n > 0. From the definition of Bv, there exists
Similarly, there exists x 2 ∈ Γ(x 1 ) and z 1 ∈ Ω(x 1 , x 2 ) (depending on ε 1 and
Then by Increasing Monotonicity,
By induction, one builds (z,x) ∈ Σ(x 0 ) such that
by v ≤ v < +∞ and Increasing Monotonicity Assumption.
Take the infimum with respect to n and then the supremum with respect to
By Increasing Monotonicity, for every
and z 1 ∈ Ω(x 1 , x 2 ), one has
Take (z,x) ∈ Σ(x 0 ).
, and together with Equation J.16,
is proved in this case.
Assume now that v(x 0 ) > −∞, and let us prove that for everyz
If A n (z, 0) = −∞ for an infinite number of n, lim n→+∞ A n (z, 0) = −∞ and Equation J.21 is true.
Otherwise, if A n (z, 0) > −∞ for n large enough, from above, we can assume that A n (z, 0) is finite for n large enough, and from Equation J.20
for n large enough. Taking then the supremum limit, we get
Thus from (T1) Assumption satisfied by f , for everyz ∈ Σ 0 (x 0 ) we get Equation J.21, which is also true whenz / ∈ Σ 0 (x 0 ), because then lim n→+∞ A n (z, 0) = −∞.
Taking the supremum forz ∈ Σ(x 0 ) in J.21, we finally get
, and from Equation J.16, Assertion 1.b is proved.
Step 4. We finally prove Assertion 2. Assume v and v above also satisfy 
Similarly, lower convergence implies that there exists an integer N 2 > 0 such that for every N ≥ N 2 and every
one has:
Then take N = max{N 1 , N 2 } to get the other definition.
For the conversely statement, takex ∈ +∞ t=1 Γ t x 0 , ε > 0 and assume there exists an integer N > 0 such that for every N ≥ N and for every
By definition,
Finally, for every N ≥ N ,
and we get upper convergence. Similarly, we get lower convergence.
L. Proof of Corollary 4.1
First prove the following Lemma, which provide candidates satisfying Transversality Assumption.
Lemma L.1. Assume Null Assumption, and let U be biconvergent over Proof. By definition, inf x∈M g(x) = lim n→+∞ g(x n ) for some sequence (x n ) in M . Without any loss of generality, since M is compact, one can assume that (x n ) converges to some x ∈ M . Since f is upper semi-continuous,
The proof is similar for ii). QED Now, we prove Lemma L.1, part (i). Letz ∈ Σ(x 0 ). One has
(by definition of v) This last quantity can be made as small as one wishes for T large enough by biconvergence, which proves that v satisfies (T 1 ).
The proof of Lemma L.1, Part (ii) is similar.
Let us prove Lemma L.1, Part (iii). To show that v satisfies (T 1 ), follow the proof above. Simply note that v(x T ) can be written U (ỹ) for someỹ (depending on T ), and we can mimic the proof above without using any infimum. This ends the proof of Lemma L.1 (since the proof is similar for v).
We finally prove Corollary 4.1.
Define, for every x 0 ∈ X, v(x 0 ) = max U ( We shall prove that Bv ≤ v, and Bv ≥ v. First, to prove Bv ≤ v, let x 0 ∈ X.
Bv(x 0 ) = sup
A(x 1 , v(x 1 )) = sup
= sup
A(x 1 , U (x 2 , x 3 , . . . , x n , . . .))
U (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n , . . .)
≤ sup xt∈Γ t (x 0 ),∀t≥1
U (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n , . . .) = v(x 0 )
Let us show that Bv ≥ v.
≥ sup
A(x 1 , U (x 2 , x 3 , ...))
(from the Claim above)
≥ sup to the infimum with respect to n, one obtains an upper-semicontinuous function of (ε k ) k≥1 as well. Consequently, and since the feasibility contraint has a closed and compact graph, from Berge theorem, we get that f is upper semicontinuous at 0, the null sequence (in fact everywwhere).
Thus, we can recover Theorem 4.2, which concludes that v * (x 0 ) = supx ∈Σ(x 0 ) U (x)
is the only fixed point of the Bellman operator.
